---
id: "0296a9f2-9012-4425-8748-1f5cbcf0f83f"
kind: "link"
title: "Ghana's resolvers validate DNSSEC widely, but .gh is still unsigned"
language: "en"
section: "security"
date: "2026-10-29T17:20:13Z"
updated: "2026-10-29T17:20:13Z"
canonical: "https://tldlog.com/l/ghanas-resolvers-validate-dnssec-widely-gh-is-still-unsigned/"
origin: "master"
translations:
  de: "https://tldlog.com/de/l/ghanas-resolver-pruefen-dnssec-weitgehend-doch-gh-ist-noch/"
source:
  name: "circleid.com"
  url: "https://circleid.com/posts/dnssec-in-ghana-99-can-validate-but-.gh-remains-unsigned"
  language: "en"
  date: "2026-10-29T14:53:00Z"
---

# Ghana's resolvers validate DNSSEC widely, but .gh is still unsigned

## in plain words

Most internet users in Ghana use computer systems that can check a special security code on website addresses. The main domain ending for Ghana, .gh, does not yet use that same security code, so the checks cannot reach domains under it.

APNIC Labs measurements report that about 99 per cent of measured users in Ghana rely on DNS resolvers that perform DNSSEC validation. The commentator notes that this figure does not mean 99 per cent of Ghanaian domain names are DNSSEC-signed. The country-code top-level domain .gh remains unsigned.

The author explains that DNS translates domain names into IP addresses, and that DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS data so that validating resolvers can check the answers through a chain of trust. A user may rely on a validating resolver while visiting a domain that is not signed, in which case the resolver cannot authenticate that domain's data. A signed domain may also be reached through non-validating resolvers, which gain nothing from the signature.

The author says that when the .gh zone is unsigned, the chain of trust cannot pass through the .gh delegation to authenticate signed domains beneath it. Signing a top-level domain requires technical planning, key management, coordination with the parent zone and procedures for keeping the chain of trust intact, and is not simply a matter of changing a setting.

The commentary cites York (2023), writing for the Internet Society, who says DNSSEC needs both domain operators to sign DNS data and resolvers to validate it. It also cites OECD policy analysis identifying gaps in signing and validation rates as obstacles to broader DNS security.

The author also cites Chung et al. (2017), whose study of DNSSEC adoption found that registrars play a significant role in whether domain holders can deploy DNSSEC successfully. The study identified barriers including limited registrar support, cumbersome implementation processes and problems with the mechanisms used to communicate DNSSEC information.

Source: [circleid.com](https://circleid.com/posts/dnssec-in-ghana-99-can-validate-but-.gh-remains-unsigned)
