---
id: "73933403-a147-4997-8bb8-29286e02e7d5"
kind: "link"
title: "Phishing domains can be linked through shared nameservers"
language: "en"
section: "security"
date: "2026-10-26T20:02:58Z"
updated: "2026-10-26T20:02:58Z"
canonical: "https://tldlog.com/l/phishing-domains-can-be-linked-through-shared-nameservers/"
origin: "master"
translations:
  es: "https://tldlog.com/es/l/dominios-phishing-pueden-vincularse-servidores-nombres/"
  de: "https://tldlog.com/de/l/phishing-domains-lassen-sich-gemeinsam-genutzte-nameserver/"
  fr: "https://tldlog.com/fr/l/domaines-phishing-peuvent-etre-lies-leurs-serveurs-noms/"
  it: "https://tldlog.com/it/l/domini-phishing-collegabili-tramite-name-server-condivisi/"
  pt-BR: "https://tldlog.com/pt/l/dominios-phishing-podem-ser-ligados-servidores-nomes/"
  ru: "https://tldlog.com/ru/l/fishingovye-domeny-mozhno-svyazat-obshchie-dns-servery/"
  zh-Hans: "https://tldlog.com/zh/l/wangluo-diaoyu-gongxiang-yuming-guanlian/"
source:
  name: "circleid.com"
  url: "https://circleid.com/posts/the-phishing-domain-you-missed-shares-a-nameserver-with-the-one-you-caught"
  language: "en"
  date: "2026-10-26T17:32:00Z"
---

# Phishing domains can be linked through shared nameservers

## in plain words

Bad websites often come in groups set up by the same people. Bismah Malik says security teams can spot them by checking which name servers the sites use. A name server is the computer that tells the internet where a website lives, and rare ones are the strongest clues.

Bismah Malik describes a common case: a team receives a phishing report, blocks the domain, files a takedown and closes the ticket, when that one domain may be only a small part of a larger operation.

Malik says most domain monitoring checks new registrations for brand names, watches selected TLDs and flags lookalike names. That catches only what attackers chose to call their domains, and attackers often vary their names. Malik cites Interisle Consulting Group’s Phishing Landscape 2025, which covered May 2024 to April 2025 and found that 77% of phishing domains reported in that period were registered by attackers rather than compromised, with at least 37% registered in bulk, up from 27% the year before. Interisle counts a set as bulk when at least ten reported domains go through the same registrar less than ten minutes apart. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 described clustering 842 domains registered within the same hour that all served one gambling campaign. Infoblox reported detecting an average of 11,000 new registered DGA domains per day in 2024.

Malik argues that the nameserver is harder for attackers to change than a name. Configuring DNS across hundreds of domains is tedious, so operators automate and reuse their setups, which leaves a trail. Each domain’s NS record, published in its TLD’s zone file, names the servers that answer DNS queries for it. Many domains can point to the same nameserver, so one server can link domains whose names have nothing in common. The method starts with one confirmed malicious domain, looks up its delegated nameservers, and then finds every other domain delegated to those servers across all TLDs within a recent window. Malik cites the DarkDNS study by Sommese et al., published at ACM IMC 2024, which found that 97.5% of newly registered domains kept their initial nameservers for their first 24 hours, so sibling domains can be found early, before phishing content appears.

Malik says the value of a nameserver depends on how rare it is. A private or rare nameserver is close to a campaign fingerprint, because few legitimate domains share it. A large shared provider such as Cloudflare, Route 53 or a major registrar’s default DNS serves millions of unrelated customers, so on its own that nameserver reveals little. The DarkDNS authors found that about half of the short-lived domains they confirmed used Cloudflare’s nameservers. For shared providers, Malik suggests combining filters, pairing the nameserver with a brand wildcard and a narrow time window, since bulk registrations cluster in time.

Source: [circleid.com](https://circleid.com/posts/the-phishing-domain-you-missed-shares-a-nameserver-with-the-one-you-caught)
